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ABSTRACT: This invited article is a response to the paper “Quantum Misuse in 
Psychic Literature,” by Jack A. Mroczkowski and Alexis P. Malozemoff, published 
in this issue of the Journal of Near-Death Studies. Whereas I sympathize with 
Mroczkowski’s and Malozemoff’s cause and goals, and I recognize the problem 
they attempted to tackle, I argue that their criticisms often overshot the mark 
and end up adding to the confusion. I address nine specific technical points that 
Mroczkowski and Malozemoff accused popular writers in the fields of health care 
and parapsychology of misunderstanding and misrepresenting. I argue that, by 
and large—and contrary to Mroczkowski’s and Malozemoff’s claims—the state-
ments made by these writers are often reasonable and generally consistent with 
the current state of play in foundations of quantum mechanics.
KEY WORDS: quantum mechanics, physical realism, nonlocality, psi, holistic 
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I appreciate this opportunity to respond to Jack A. Mroczkowski and 
Alexis P. Malozemoff’s (2019) article “Quantum Misuse in Psychic Lit-
erature” published in this issue of the Journal of Near-Death Studies. 
Let me start by acknowledging that I sympathize with Mroczkowski’s 
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and Malozemoff’s—henceforth ‘the authors’—cause. Few scholars 
would deny that Quantum Mechanics (QM) has been the subject of 
misuse, so it is laudable that these authors have attempted to correct 
at least some of it. The authors’ goal of encouraging others “to avoid 
augmenting their discussions with improper references to physics” 
(p. 132) is unimpeachable and timely. There is much I agree with in 
their paper.
However, I believe the authors overshot the mark with their criti-
cism. In my view, some of what they considered misuse are  legitimate 
—if sometimes poorly worded—attempts to highlight that QM defies 
most people’s ordinary prejudices about the nature of reality. These 
prejudices define what is typically considered plausible or implausible, 
thereby motivating many people to mistakenly dismiss important pos-
sibilities in fields such as health care and parapsychology.
Although QM has been around for nearly a century, its implications 
haven’t yet percolated through other scientific disciplines. As a matter 
of fact, even within physics itself, the community of ‘foundations of 
physics’—scholars who ponder the metaphysical implications of QM— 
is relatively small. From this perspective, it is difficult—at least in 
principle—to fault attempts to bring to popular attention the degrees 
of natural freedom that QM may open up.
Bizarrely, popular culture is still dominated by the constraints of a 
naïve local-realism that QM has definitively relegated to the trash bin 
of history. It is thus not only legitimate, but arguably even imperative, 
that thought leaders play a prominent role in expanding cultural ho-
rizons in this regard. The formidable momentum behind naïve local-
realism must be countered, lest people continue to live under a limit-
ing and—most importantly—mistaken view of reality.
Although some popular writers may have worded their claims inac-
curately, discussing the mind-bending implications of QM both acces-
sibly and accurately is a formidable challenge. The authors  themselves 
—who, unlike most of the popular writers they criticized, have the ad-
vantage of being experts in the field—have been admittedly unable to 
do so. They compensated for this shortcoming by adding parenthetical 
clarifications accessible only to experts. Yet, as far as regular readers 
are concerned, these parenthetical clarifications do nothing to prevent 
misunderstandings; they merely serve as disclaimers to safeguard the 
authors.
The impasse readers are left with is thus the following: On the one 
hand, thought leaders in fields where the implications of QM are sa-
lient must engage their public on the possibilities these implications 
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open up; on the other hand, they must do it in a minimally accurate 
manner. There is significant tension between these two goals and no 
magic bullet to resolve it. The best way forward may be to engage in a 
critical dialogue in which scholars seek to find a balance. This is the 
spirit of the present response.
In the next sections, I shall comment on nine specific technical 
points raised by the authors.
Nine Technical Points
1. The Physical World as Illusion
The authors suggested that the characterization of the physical world 
as illusory is not justified by QM. To evaluate whether this suggestion 
is correct requires first an understanding of what it means to claim 
that the world is an illusion.
Most ordinary people would take the world to be real—as opposed 
to illusory—if its measurable physical properties existed indepen-
dently of whether and how they are observed. An act of observation 
should merely disclose a self-existing physical reality, not create or 
define it. This presumed independence from observation—technically 
called ‘non-contextuality’—is what underlies most people’s intuition of 
the world’s concreteness. To claim that the world is an illusion there-
fore means to deny non-contextuality: If the physical properties of the 
world actually depend on how they are observed—as opposed to exist-
ing in and by themselves—then the world is an illusion.
So what does QM say about it? Operationally, non-contextuality 
means that the outcome of a measurement should not depend on the 
way another, separate but simultaneous, measurement is performed. 
According to quantum theory, however, this is simply not the case. 
The relevant question is then whether quantum theory is correct.
Since Alain Aspect’s seminal experiments (Aspect, Dalibard, & 
Roger, 1982; Aspect, Grangier, & Roger, 1981, 1982), the predictions 
of quantum theory in this regard have been repeatedly confirmed. The 
year 1998 was particularly fruitful, with two remarkable experiments 
performed in Switzerland (Tittel, Brendel, Zbinden, & Gisin, 1998) 
and Austria (Weihs, Jennewein, Simon, Weinfurter, & Zeilinger, 
1998). More recent experiments again challenged non-contextuality 
(Lapkiewicz, Li, Schaeff, Langford, Ramelow, Wiesniak, & Zeilinger, 
2011, Manning, Khakimov, Dall, & Truscott, 2015). Commenting on 
them, physicist Anton Zeilinger has been quoted as saying that “there 
is no sense in assuming that what we do not measure about a system 
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has [an independent] reality” (Ananthaswamy, 2011). Finally, Dutch 
researchers (Hensen et al., 2015) and a large international collabora-
tion (The BIG Bell Test Collaboration, 2018) successfully performed 
tests closing all potential loopholes and definitively proving quantum 
theory correct.
The only way out for the adherents of non-contextuality is to specu-
late about the existence of hidden physical properties ‘smeared out’ 
across spacetime. It turns out, however, that certain predictions of 
quantum theory are incompatible with non-contextuality even for a 
large and important class of such speculations (Leggett, 2003). Ex-
periments have now confirmed these predictions (Gröblacher, Paterek, 
Kaltenbaek, Brukner, Zukowski, Aspelmeyer, & Aeilinger, 2007; Ro - 
mero, Leach, Jack, Barnett, Padgett, & Franke-Arnold, 2010) with 
results so significant that the science press has felt compelled to 
pronounce, “Quantum physics says goodbye to reality” (Cartwright, 
2007).
The surviving interpretation of QM that could, in principle, still 
preserve non-contextuality is Bohmian Mechanics (Bohm, 1952a, 
1952b). Alas, this interpretation is plagued by a number of other 
problems. For instance, unlike regular QM with its Quantum Field 
Theory extensions, Bohmian Mechanics has no relativistic version. 
Physicists Raymond Streater and Luboš Motl have reviewed other 
compelling technical arguments against Bohmian Mechanics (Motl, 
2009; Streater, 2007, pp. 103–112). Finally, recent experiments have 
reportedly refuted the interpretation empirically (Wolchover, 2018).
Admittedly, there is still polemic surrounding not only Bohm-
ian Mechanics but also the experimental results that refute non- 
contextuality. It is nonetheless fair to say that never before has the 
idea of a real physical world, independent of observation, looked so 
precarious. Non-contextuality, if not dead, is in serious trouble.
Consequently, it seems entirely reasonable to claim that, as far as 
QM is concerned, the physical world people ordinarily experience is in-
deed akin to an ‘illusion.’ Prior to being observed, physical quantities 
are only potentials—modeled by waves of probabilities—as opposed to 
defined existences.
2. Personal Physical Realities
The authors criticized the assertion by Deepak Chopra that “the phys-
ical world, including our bodies, is a response of the observer. We cre-
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ate our bodies as we create the experience of our world” (Chopra, 1993, 
p. 5; Mroczkowski & Malozemoff, 2019, p. 144). Chopra went on to 
acknowledge that “these are vast assumptions, the makings of a new 
reality, yet all are grounded in the discoveries of quantum physics 
made almost a hundred years ago” (Chopra, 1993, p. 7; Mroczkowski 
& Malozemoff, 2019, p. 144). So, once again, the question remains 
whether grounding—not proof, not irrefutable evidence, just ground-
ing for this claim of Chopra’s—exists within QM.
As the authors acknowledged, QM has many different metaphysi-
cal interpretations. There is no consensus in physics regarding which 
interpretation is more likely, let alone true. But one of the more sober, 
parsimonious, and flat-out honest interpretations is Carlo Rovelli’s 
(1996) Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM). According to RQM, 
there are no absolute—that is, observer-independent— physical quan-
tities. Instead, all physical quantities—the entire physical world—are 
relative to the observer in a way analogous to motion.
Rovelli (1996) summarized RQM thus:
[Because] different observers give different accounts of the same se-
quence of events, . . . each quantum mechanical description has to be 
understood as relative to a particular observer. Thus, a quantum me-
chanical description of a certain system (state and/or values of physical 
quantities) cannot be taken as an “absolute” (observer- independent) 
description of reality, but rather as a formalization, or codification, of 
properties of a system relative to a given observer. (p. 1648)
The implication is that each person, as an individual observer, ‘inhab-
its’ one’s own physical world, as defined by the context of one’s own 
observations. This assertion comes very close to the notion, suggested 
by Chopra, that each person lives in a physical reality created in re-
sponse to one’s own observations.
However, a reader might inquire whether RQM is true. Any definite 
answer to this question would overlook the morass of unending dis-
cord that prevails in the field of foundations of physics. Nevertheless, 
a very recent and significant experimental result has arguably proven 
the central and defining point of RQM: that the physical world is, in-
deed, relative to the observer in a way analogous to motion (Proietti et 
al., 2019; see also Emerging Technology from the arXiv, 2019).
Therefore, in view of the current state of play in QM, Chopra’s 
 statements—albeit speculative—are neither crazy nor ungrounded in 
QM. Counterintuitive as it may sound, the idea of relative physical 
worlds can even be reconciled with the experience that all people share 
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a common environment. I address this idea more fully in Chapter 6 
of my latest book, The Idea of the World (Kastrup, 2019, pp. 93–122).
3. Choice and Randomness
The authors criticized popular writers who suggested that intention 
may directly influence the physical world’s transition from potentials 
to defined existences—that is, the so-called ‘collapse of the wave func-
tion’ somehow associated with an act of observation. The authors rea-
soned that, according to QM, collapse produces random outcomes, 
thereby “preventing a person from choosing or intending a particular 
desirable outcome” (Mroczkowski & Malozemoff, 2019, p. 137).
I believe the authors’ reasoning here is flawed. First, it is important 
to consider that randomness is a highly ambiguous concept: Whereas 
it is defined as the absence of recognizable patterns or biases—there 
being formal randomness tests to verify whether this is the case—
a truly random process can, theoretically, produce any pattern. The 
chance of finding a pattern in a truly random process may be small, 
but it isn’t zero. Indeed, because it basically consists of an acknowledg-
ment of causal ignorance, randomness is an extraordinarily accom-
modating notion.
Given this point, insisting that a process is random doesn’t actually 
exclude any outcome whatsoever. It is physically coherent—whether 
plausible or not—that intention may indeed influence collapse out-
comes without violating quantum theory. To argue that this cannot be 
the case merely because QM does not positively predict such an effect 
begs the question: The point in contention is precisely that there may 
be natural agencies or organizing principles that current science still 
fails to recognize.
Moreover, the randomness of wave function collapse is defined on 
the basis of a series of repeated observations of the same quantum 
system. For instance, if one measures the spin of an electron along a 
certain direction, the result will be either ½ or -½. If one then resets 
the experiment—ensuring that all initial conditions are the same as 
before—and redoes the measurement, again the result will be either 
½ or -½. A series of such measurements will produce a string of num-
bers. It is the string that should meet randomness criteria. But a tech-
nically random string, of course, does not preclude the possibility that 
individual measurements within it can be influenced by intention in 
a way that may not be noticeable in the overall string. And even if an 
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overall statistical bias is noticeable, no skeptic will raise an eyebrow 
as, theoretically, random processes can—as argued above—produce 
any conceivable pattern by mere chance.
4. Synchronicity
Quantum predictions hold only at a statistical level. The outcomes 
of individual measurements—that is, individual observations or 
events—are non-deterministic and unpredictable; quantum theory 
enforces no result whatsoever at the level of individual outcomes. It is 
this causally undetermined space that psychiatrist Carl Jung and No-
bel Prize Laureate physicist Wolfgang Pauli populated with their no-
tion of ‘synchronicity’: acausal meaningful coincidences that allegedly 
reflect archetypal patterns underlying not only the human psyche, but 
also the physical world at large (Jung, 1985, Jung & Pauli, 2001).
The authors denied “that something about quantum theory may 
explain the serial coincidences that underlie synchronicity” (Mrocz-
kowski & Malozemoff, 2019, p. 150). I believe this statement, although 
strictly correct, is misleading in that it sets up a straw man. The point 
is not that QM positively accounts for synchronicities; the point is 
that—unlike classical physics—QM leaves space open for synchron-
icities. Indeed, according to QM, at its most fundamental level na-
ture is not deterministic; there is no causal necessity enforced at that 
level. This notion opens the door to other organizing principles still 
unknown to science.
The authors repeatedly argued that wave function collapse leads to 
random outcomes. But this seeming randomness does not contradict 
synchronicity either: Regarding the latter, theorists have postulated 
that nature organizes itself according to global archetypal patterns. 
These global patterns can be easily reconciled with apparent random-
ness at the level of individual quantum events, as I illustrate with the 
following analogy.
Imagine that you toss three dice on a table, multiple times. After 
each toss, each individual die randomly displays a number from one 
to six. In other words, the behavior of each die is seemingly random 
from toss to toss. But now imagine that when you look at all three 
dice together, after every toss, you realize that either they all display 
an even number or they all display an odd number. This is a simple 
hypothetical example of a global, synchronistic pattern that can occur 
even when the individual constituent events, considered in isolation, 
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meet randomness criteria. In Jung’s words, “Within the randomness 
of the throwing of the dice, a ‘psychic’ orderedness comes into being” 
(Jung & Pauli, 2001, p. 62).
If this kind of global synchronistic alignment were to happen across 
quantum events in the world at large, physicists would be none the 
wiser. For although they can test individual events in the laboratory 
and verify that, when taken in isolation, the events are random, they 
wouldn’t be able to discern a global pattern within the complexity of 
the physical world at large; there are just too many ‘dice’ to look at 
under controlled laboratory conditions.
The relationship between synchronicity and QM, which I articu-
lated above, has been vouchsafed by Pauli himself. After reviewing 
the final draft of Jung’s synchronicity essay, Pauli wrote: “I . . . found 
that . . . from the standpoint of modern physics, [the essay] is now un-
assailable” (Jung & Pauli, 2001, p. 71, emphasis added).
5. Emptiness
Many popular writers have highlighted the fact that, when looked at 
closely, matter reveals itself to be mostly empty space. If one considers 
the total volume of an atom and compares it to the aggregate volume of 
its constituent mass-containing subatomic particles—such as quarks 
and leptons—one realizes that the atom is indeed mostly empty. The 
authors, however, argued that such a conclusion “bears no relation to 
modern quantum physics” because “the wave function [of the subatomic 
particles] fills space” (Mroczkowski & Malozemoff, 2019, p. 144).
I believe the authors’ argument here is flawed in more ways than 
one. First, they seem to have implicitly taken for granted that the 
wave function is ontic—that it corresponds to an objectively existing 
physical entity smeared out across space. There is certainly no consen-
sus in physics that this is the case. Many physicists maintain, instead, 
that the wave function is merely epistemic—that it merely captures 
the extent of human knowledge regarding nature’s future behavior. If 
the latter position is true, then there is nothing objectively real that 
“fills space” inside an atom.
Be that as it may, when one says that an atom is ‘mostly empty’ one 
is referring to the fact that most of the space in the atom contains no 
mass. A well-illuminated vacuum is still considered empty, in that 
photons have no mass. Similarly, a vacuum filled with electromag-
netic fields is still empty, for fields—abstract mathematical tools—do 
not count as ‘occupants’ of space as far as the popular intuition about 
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‘emptiness’ is concerned. Now, because mass is a measurable physi-
cal quantity—an ‘observable’—one can speak of its existence only af-
ter wave function collapse—or whatever passes for collapse, because 
even that phenomenon is not consensus in physics today. What then 
remains is a set of mass-containing subatomic particles that, indeed, 
occupy but a tiny fraction of the atom’s total volume.
There is just no denying that 20th-century subatomic physics has 
ushered in an understanding that contradicts popular intuitions 
about the solidity of matter. These intuitions are a throwback to out-
dated Greek atomist views. In this context, I believe it to be valid that 
popular writers point out to their audiences that, contrary to vulgar 
assumptions, matter indeed is ‘mostly empty space.’
6. Consciousness as the Agency of Collapse
The authors criticized the notion that consciousness might be the 
agency behind the transition of the physical world, upon observation, 
from mere potentialities to defined physical quantities. They said, 
“this interpretation has not been proven and is not generally accepted 
by quantum physicists” (Mroczkowski & Malozemoff, 2019, p. 138). 
Although strictly correct, such statement also sets up a straw man: No 
interpretation of QM has been proven or generally accepted by quan-
tum physicists. I do not believe this state of affairs should stop all 
authors from ever alluding to, or speculating about, the implications 
of QM.
If consciousness does not cause wave function collapse—or what-
ever passes for collapse—then it follows that an inanimate entity of 
some sort must be responsible for it. Yet, the claim that inanimate 
 objects—such as electronic detectors—can perform quantum mechan-
ical measurements is fundamentally problematic, because the parti-
tioning of the world into discrete inanimate objects is merely nominal 
to begin with. Is a rock integral to the mountain it helps constitute? 
If so, does it become a separate object merely by virtue of its getting 
detached from the mountain? And if so, does it then perform a quan-
tum measurement—that is, an observation that causes collapse of the 
wave function—each time it comes back in contact with the mountain 
as it bounces down the slope? Brief contemplation of these questions 
shows that the boundaries of a detector are arbitrary.
Indeed, as John von Neumann (2018) first argued, when two in-
animate objects interact they simply become quantum mechanically 
entangled with one another—that is, they become united in such a 
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way that the behavior of one becomes inextricably linked to the behav-
ior of the other—but no actual measurement is performed. As such, 
the inanimate world is a unitary, indivisible physical system governed 
by QM. There are no detectors performing measurements; there is 
only the one inanimate world. In the words of Erich Joos, “because of 
the non-local properties of quantum states, a consistent description of 
some phenomenon in quantum terms must finally include the entire 
universe” (Joos, 2006, p. 71).
Let me use a concrete example to be more specific. In the well-known 
double-slit experiment, electrons are shot through two tiny slits. 
When they are observed at the slits, the electrons behave as defined 
individual particles. But when observed only after they have passed 
through the slits, the ‘electrons’ behave as superposed potentialities. 
In 1998, researchers at the Weizmann Institute in Israel showed that, 
when detectors are placed at the slits, the electrons behave as defined 
individual particles (Buks, Schuster, Heiblum, Mahalu, & Umansky 
1998). At first sight, this result may seem to indicate that measure-
ment does not require a conscious observer.
However, the output of the detectors becomes known only when it is 
consciously observed by a person. The hypothesis of a measurement 
before this conscious observation lacks compelling theoretical and 
empirical grounding. After all, QM offers no reason why the whole 
 system—electrons, slits, and detectors combined—should not be in 
an entangled superposition before and until someone looks at the de-
tectors’ output (von Neumann, 2018). Its condition simply cannot be 
known. Because people cannot abstract themselves out of their knowl-
edge, they cannot know that detectors actually perform measurements 
and cause wave function collapse.
Consequently, as far as people can know, before it is represented 
through conscious perception the world consists of a unitary superposi-
tion of potentialities. This superposition—indivisible, as quantum en-
tanglement prevents elements of the superposition from being describ-
able separately from one another—is incompatible with the existence 
of individual, separate objects and events with defined properties.
7. Decoherence
The authors maintained that a quantum phenomenon called ‘decoher-
ence’ “is responsible for [destroying] most unique quantum interfer-
ence effects, and this decoherence always happens before any conscious 
observation” (Mroczkowski & Malozemoff, 2019, p. 138). They seemed 
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to suggest that decoherence obviates the postulate that consciousness 
is the agency of collapse. In other words, the suggestion seems to have 
been that decoherence alone already explains the transition of a quan-
tum system from mere potentialities to defined physical quantities. 
This, however, is a well-known fallacy.
If one takes for granted the existence of a macroscopic environ-
ment consisting of defined physical quantities—that is, a classical 
 environment—from which a microscopic quantum system in a super-
position is initially isolated, then it is true that any contact with the 
environment will destroy the superposition. Information about the 
overlapping potentialities will ‘leak out’ and become dispersed in the 
surrounding environment.
The problem, however, is that decoherence cannot explain how the 
state of the surrounding environment became defined—that is,  classical 
—to begin with, so it doesn’t solve the measurement problem or rule 
out the role of consciousness. As Wojciech Zurek—one of the fathers of 
decoherence—acknowledged,
An exhaustive answer to [the question of why we perceive a classical 
world instead of superposed potentialities] would undoubtedly have 
to involve a model of “consciousness,” since what we are really asking 
concerns our (observers) impression that “we are conscious” of just one 
of the alternatives. (Zurek, 1994, p. 29)
As Joos (2006) pointed out, “the effects of decoherence just look like 
collapse” (p. 77). Indeed, in an essay dedicated to highlighting the role 
of decoherence in the emergence of a classical world from a quantum 
substrate, Joos ultimately concluded that some form of either wave 
function collapse or parallel universes is still needed (p. 75). Decoher-
ence alone will not do.
In conclusion, decoherence does not obviate or preclude the possibil-
ity that consciousness is the agency behind collapse.
8. Microscopic Versus Macroscopic
Another argument line frequently repeated by the authors is that the 
quantum phenomena popular writers rely on occur mostly at a micro-
scopic level. The authors seemed to imply that fundamental or meta-
physical conclusions cannot be extrapolated from this microscopic 
realm to the macroscopic world of tables and chairs.
Although there are undeniable operational differences between the 
behavior of the world of tables and chairs and that of isolated micro-
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scopic quantum systems, these differences cannot be fundamental; 
they must, instead, be merely epiphenomenal. After all, the world is 
quantum, for macroscopic objects and events are just compound re-
sults of microscopic dynamics. To quote Joos (2006) once again,
[A] method for sweeping the interpretive problems under the carpet is 
simply to assume, or rather postulate, that quantum theory is only a 
theory of micro-objects, whereas in the macroscopic realm per decree 
(or should I say wishful thinking?) a classical description has to be 
valid. Such an approach leads to the endlessly discussed paradoxes 
of quantum theory. These paradoxes only arise because this particu-
lar approach is conceptually inconsistent . . . In addition, micro- and 
macro-objects are so strongly dynamically coupled that we do not even 
know where the boundary between the two supposed realms could 
possibly be found. For these reasons it seems obvious that there is no 
boundary. (pp. 74–75; emphasis added)
He went on to say, “whichever interpretation [of QM] one prefers, 
the classical world view has been ruled out” (Joos, 2006, p. 76). It is 
this understanding that motivates popular writers to speculate about 
what new degrees of natural freedom may open up, in the macroscopic 
world, when the implications of QM are considered. There is nothing 
wrong—at least in principle—with this extrapolation, for there is no 
actual boundary between the microscopic and the macroscopic. The 
distinction between the two is arbitrary, nominal, motivated by conve-
nience, and purely epistemic.
9. Superluminal Information Transfer
The authors frequently alluded to the ‘no-communication theo-
rem’ of quantum information theory to emphasize that quantum 
 entanglement—despite its “spooky action at a distance”—cannot be 
used for faster-than-light information transfer. This conclusion is, of 
course, entirely correct. The problem is that the authors seemed to set 
up yet another straw man by implying that popular writers have re-
lied on superluminal communication to account for psi phenomena. In 
this regard, they singled out Pim van Lommel’s allusion to the notion 
of nonlocal consciousness.
The straw man here is as follows: The very idea of nonlocal con-
sciousness entails that reality is fundamentally one and, as such, com-
munication is obviated to begin with. In the words of Jonathan Schaf-
fer (2010), “physically, there is good evidence that the cosmos forms 
an entangled system and good reason to treat entangled systems as 
irreducible wholes (p. 32, emphasis added).
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Therefore, at the most fundamental level of reality—the level in 
which psi phenomena allegedly occur—there is no need for informa-
tion transfer to begin with. In the altered state of consciousness near-
death experiencers find themselves in, they are ostensibly one with all 
existence, and so the information in question is already ‘in them,’ so to 
speak. Nothing needs to be communicated from one place to another 
because the information is, ex hypothesi, already ‘everywhere.’ The al-
lusion here is rather to something akin to Bohm’s (1980) ‘implicate 
order’ than to information transfer, superluminal or otherwise.
Notice that I am not necessarily arguing for, or defending, psi, for 
I am not familiar enough with the subject to take an informed posi-
tion either way. I am just pointing out that the argument for psi some 
popular writers make, though certainly reliant on the implications 
of QM, does not—contrary to what the authors claimed—necessarily 
entail superluminal communication. The allusion to entanglement is 
meant to underpin the possibility that the entire cosmos is fundamen-
tally a unitary whole, not necessarily an appeal to information trans-
fer through entanglement.
Commentary
A recurring theme in the authors’ argumentation is the claim that cer-
tain views—particularly those related to foundations of physics—are 
not generally accepted by physicists, are controversial, disputed, and 
so forth. The repeated suggestion is that, unless the physics commu-
nity has reached consensus regarding a certain position, nobody else 
should speculate about or around it. The problem, of course, is that 
there is no consensus regarding any position when it comes to inter-
pretations of QM, not only those the authors criticized. Therefore, if 
the authors were to have it their way, all popular debate regarding the 
implications of QM would cease. 
I do not believe this outcome would be constructive. Although there 
is no consensus about what is the case, there is sufficient clarity and 
confidence about some very important things that—physicists already 
know—are not the case: Naïve local-realism has been categorically 
refuted, and this alone has tremendous repercussions in nearly ev-
ery field of human activity. This is the elephant in the room. I do 
not believe that authors should close their eyes to it until physicists 
and philosophers have reached consensus about an alternative; I 
do not believe that popular writers in the fields of health care and 
 parapsychology—to name only two—should pretend that business can 
continue as usual, as if naïve local-realism were true. 
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Although physicists are the authority when it comes to models of 
nature’s behavior, they don’t own their results. The discoveries of 
QM reveal the inner workings of nature and, as such, belong to ev-
eryone, for humans are all natural beings born from, and into, this 
universe. As such, people are all equally entitled—perhaps even mor-
ally  required—to integrate these discoveries into their meditations 
about life, the universe, and everything; even—to the horror of the 
self- appointed skeptical police—those popular writers in the fields of 
health care and parapsychology.
Moreover, wild—and often ungrounded—speculation isn’t a privi-
lege of non-physicists. Today, physics itself is indulging in the most 
farfetched feast of speculations ever concocted by the human mind: 
multiple different types of parallel universes, each type potentially 
comprising a multi-dimensional infinity of such universes; 10 spatial 
dimensions, many of which are supposedly curled up into tight little 
knots of extraordinary topological complexity; widely conflicting views 
about the nature of time, such as that time does not actually exist, 
that time is precisely the only thing that in fact exists (space being il-
lusory), and that time exists but isn’t fundamental, emerging instead 
from microscopic quantum processes; the accommodation of complete 
unknowns by mere labeling, such as the notions of dark matter and 
dark energy; widely differing views regarding the origin and early 
evolution of the universe; and the list goes on. Given all these seri-
ously discussed hypotheses, it is difficult for physicists to take the 
moral high ground and criticize non-physicists based merely on the 
fact that the latter are engaging in physical speculation. Compared 
to the conjectures of many professional physicists, allusions to quan-
tum phenomena in health care and parapsychological literature sound 
rather moderate and conservative.
I acknowledge that this is not the authors’ intended point or the 
spirit of their criticism. For them the problem is not per se that popular 
writers are engaging in physical speculation, but that these writers 
may be trying to misappropriate the authority of physics so to pass 
false or implausible claims for scientific fact. This kind of misappro-
priation is doubtlessly pernicious, dangerous, and I condemn it in the 
strongest terms.
However, as I have argued in this response, I do not believe that 
this really is what the popular writers that the authors singled out 
were doing. What these writers stated in their works seems to me to 
be, by and large, reasonable enough—if poorly worded—given recent 
results from physics.
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Although attempting to do something doubtlessly valid and im-
portant, I suspect the authors, by overshooting the mark, may have 
contributed to the very confusion they were trying to combat. This 
outcome is unfortunate—but shouldn’t stop efforts to separate wheat 
from chaff and bring some clarity to the reigning confusion around the 
foundations of quantum mechanics.
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